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Background: Zimbabwe is the largest tobacco producer in Africa. Despite expressing opposition in the past,
Zimbabwe recently acceded to the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).
We explored why Zimbabwe acceded to the FCTC and the potential implications for tobacco control within
Zimbabwe and globally.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative archival case study based on 542 documents collected from 1) the Truth
Tobacco Industry Documents; 2) media indexed in the Lexis-Nexis media database; 3) the websites for tobacco
growers’ associations, tobacco control groups, and international agencies; 4) FCTC reports and Framework
Convention Alliance newsletters; 5) Zimbabwe’s legal codes; and 6) the peer reviewed scientific literature related to
tobacco growing.
Results: Zimbabwe has a long history of tobacco growing. There are currently over 90,000 tobacco farmers, and
tobacco growing is prioritized, despite widespread food insecurity and environmental degradation. Zimbabwean
government officials have been outspoken FCTC critics; but recently joined the accord to better protect
Zimbabwe’s tobacco growing interests. FCTC membership obligates nations to implement a variety of tobacco
control measures; Zimbabwe has implemented several measures aimed at reducing tobacco demand, but fewer
aimed at reducing tobacco supply or protecting the environment. Zimbabwe joins the FCTC amid increased efforts
to protect FCTC proceedings from industry interference, to adopt recommendations for alternative crops and
livelihoods and reduce environmental damage.
Conclusion: Zimbabwe’s decision to accede to the FCTC does not appear to represent a softening of its historical
opposition to the treaty. Thus, its status as a Party creates opportunities for it to undermine ongoing efforts to
implement and strengthen the treaty. At the same time, however, Zimbabwe’s accession could provide much
needed international support for Zimbabwe’s civic organizations and its Ministry of Health to develop stronger
tobacco control measures. How Zimbabwe’s participation impacts the work of the FCTC as a whole may ultimately
depend on the allegiances of its delegates, and the effectiveness of FCTC measures to limit tobacco industry
interference and enforce compliance with FCTC measures.
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While tobacco use is leveling off in high-income coun-
tries such as the US and Britain, the tobacco industry is
aggressively marketing to low and middle-income na-
tions [1]. Nonetheless, many African countries still have
relatively low rates of tobacco use ([2] pp. 268) suggest-
ing that the tobacco epidemic that killed 100 million in
the 20th century, mostly in higher income nations, could
still be averted there. Tobacco use is distinguished from
many other health problems by the presence of an
aggressive, transnational tobacco industry whose goals
are fundamentally incompatible with public health [3].
Like other industries, the tobacco industry not only
seeks to promote use of its products and expand into
new markets, but also seeks to weaken strong tobacco
control policies and undermine public health advocacy
efforts [4–8].
African nations played an integral role in developing
and establishing a strong policy response to the tobacco
problem, the United Nations World Health Organiza-
tion’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(WHO-FCTC) [9, 10]. The FCTC treaty entered into
force in 2005 with 40 signatories. In contrast to most of
its African neighbors, Zimbabwe, one of the largest to-
bacco producers in Africa and the world, [11] was op-
posed to the FCTC’s creation [12, 13]. However, on
December 4, 2014, Zimbabwe deposited a signed version
of the FCTC treaty to the United Nations and on March
4, 2015 Zimbabwe officially became the 180th Party to
the accord [14–16].
It is unknown what positions Zimbabwe will take as a
Party to the FCTC. If Zimbabwe uses its influence to ob-
struct, delay, or diminish FCTC provisions related to to-
bacco growing, marketing and distribution, its accession
would represent a setback for global tobacco control
efforts. Adopting the role of obstructionist would also
place Zimbabwe at odds with many of its African neigh-
bors, who continue to be actively engaged in implement-
ing the FCTC. However, as a negotiating Party,
Zimbabwe may also find itself forced to compromise in
ways that ultimately benefit tobacco control efforts
within the country and within the region.
This paper describes the role that tobacco plays in
Zimbabwe’s economy, and why the country acceded to
the FCTC. Next, it examines the obligations and privi-
leges associated with FCTC membership, and concludes
by considering the possible implications of Zimbabwe’s
accession to the FCTC for both the international to-
bacco control movement and for tobacco control within
the country.
Methods
In this archival qualitative study we examined data
from multiple sources. First, to identify tobacco industryinfluence in Zimbabwe, the first and second authors
searched the Truth Tobacco Industry Documents (TTID)
(https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/). The
TTID contains over 14 million internal tobacco industry
documents released as part of the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement between the attorneys general of 46 U.S. states
and the tobacco industry [17]. To locate documents, we
used search terms for tobacco growers’ associations ac-
tive in Zimbabwe (e.g., “International Tobacco Growers
Association,” “Zimbabwe Tobacco Association”), as well
as tobacco control activities (e.g., “World No Tobacco
Day”), and tobacco industry activity (e.g., “British
American Tobacco-Zimbabwe,” “Savanna Tobacco,”
“Courtesy of Choice Campaign”) in Zimbabwe. We re-
trieved and screened over 5,000 documents; after elim-
inating duplicates and irrelevant materials, we examined
in more detail 45 TTIDs.
Because the bulk of tobacco industry documents we
found were dated from 1981 to 2000, the first author
also searched the Lexis Nexis database for media ac-
counts of the current situation in Zimbabwe. LexisNexis
indexes over 26,000 media sources, including local, na-
tional and international newspapers, magazines, trade
journals, and radio and television broadcast transcripts.
She used search terms related to Zimbabwe and tobacco
(e.g., “Zimbabwe” AND “tobacco” OR “cigarette” OR
“smoking” OR “tobacco control” OR “FCTC”) and to
political, health, and economic dynamics in Zimbabwe
(e.g., “Zimbabwe” AND “sustainable development goals”
OR “world tobacco day” OR “deforestation” OR “envir-
onment” OR “child labour/labor” OR “tobacco exports”
OR “land reform”). She found 168 relevant media items;
most were newspaper or magazine articles or transcripts
of radio or television broadcasts from news sources in
Zimbabwe, the UK, the US, and China.
For the most current information on the activities of
tobacco growers’ associations and tobacco manufac-
turers in Zimbabwe, the first and second authors exam-
ined their websites (e.g., tobaccoleaf.org, fctobacco.com,
bat.com, savanatobacco.com). To understand the history
and process of the WHO-FCTC, the first author exam-
ined online WHO-FCTC reports (e.g., “Conference of
the Parties to the WHO FCTC, No 5, Friday, 17 October
2014”) and Framework Convention Alliance (FCA)
newsletters and reports. To understand international
tobacco issues the first and second authors examined
various websites (e.g., the United Nations Development
Program), (N = 94) reports (e.g., Food and Agriculture
Organization or World Bank) (N = 98), proceedings (e.g.,
All Africa Conference on Tobacco Control) (N = 4), and
books or book chapters (e.g., Tobacco Control in Africa:
People, Politics and Policies) (N = 7). The authors also
examined the text of Zimbabwe’s tobacco control law
(e.g., Statutory Instrument 264 of 2002). Finally, in order
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authors examined the peer reviewed scientific literature
related to tobacco growing, Africa and/or the FCTC
(N = 122). The total number of documents that served
as the basis for our analysis was 542.
We followed an approach consistent with a qualitative
case study [18]. All relevant documents were down-
loaded into an Endnote database, notes were added, key
words were assigned, and key pieces of information were
highlighted (e.g., policies on land use and tobacco grow-
ing, comments from Health Ministers about FCTC or
tobacco control measures). The documents were orga-
nized chronologically and by topic (e.g., FCTC-related
statements made over time by Zimbabwe government
officials). For validation purposes we asked two experts
involved in FCTC negotiations to review the penultimate
draft of our report.
Results
Tobacco’s role in Zimbabwe’s economy
The Zimbabwean government regards tobacco as the
“lifeblood of Zimbabwe’s economy” [13]. In 2012 the
country was the top tobacco-producing nation in Africa,
and in 2013 it was the sixth largest tobacco producer in
the world [11]. According to Zimbabwe’s Tobacco In-
dustry and Marketing Board, 98 % of Zimbabwe’s to-
bacco is exported, making it the country’s largest foreign
currency generator (accounting for 10–43 % of the
country’s gross domestic product) [19, 20]. Zimbabwe
receives a higher percent of government revenue from
tobacco leaf than any other country in the world, except
Malawi [21], partly due to a levy system that taxes both
growers and buyers [22].
Tobacco is a major source of employment: there are
over 90,000 small scale tobacco farmers in Zimbabwe
[19, 23], supported by a robust tobacco growing infra-
structure. For example, banks dedicate significant
revenue for loans to tobacco farmers [24], though small-
scale farmers have fewer loan options [25]), land (taken
in 2000 from white farmers) is preferentially given to
black tobacco farmers by the government [26–28], to-
bacco companies offer loans for seeds and fertilizer [19,
24], and tobacco farmers receive cash payments upon
delivering their crop [29]. As a result, despite widespread
hunger in Zimbabwe, farmers are more likely to grow
tobacco than grain [19, 24].
Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of
Industry and Commerce oversee tobacco industry-
related organizations such as The Tobacco Research
Board, the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board, and
the Boka Tobacco Auction Floors. Two independent
groups that claim to represent tobacco farmers’ interests,
the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) (and its
offshoot, the Farmers Development Trust, recipient ofseveral US$100,000 grants from Phillip Morris [30]), and
the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA),
are influential in Zimbabwe [31, 32]. The ZTA was
founded in 1928 (originally as the Rhodesian Tobacco
Association) to “promote and support research and
training to ensure the continued development and ex-
pansion of the flue-cured tobacco growing industry”
[32]. In 1984, the ZTA and representatives of five other
tobacco-growing nations founded the ITGA with fund-
ing from transnational tobacco companies [33–35]. Pre-
vious research has exposed the ITGA as a public
relations vehicle for transnational tobacco companies,
providing a “human face” and a “grass roots voice” to ar-
ticulate the positions of tobacco manufacturers [35, 36].
Both groups have publicly criticized the FCTC [12, 13,
32, 34, 37] and both have tried to influence FCTC pro-
ceedings [36, 38, 39].
While industry, government, and tobacco grower orga-
nizations in Zimbabwe work together to support tobacco
growing, their interests and positions sometimes con-
flict. For example, the ZTA opposed government levies
on growers and a land redistribution program in the late
1990s, which resulted in many highly productive white
tobacco farmers fleeing to Zambia, South Africa, and
Mozambique [40, 41] (where tobacco growing subse-
quently increased) [11].
Zimbabwe’s economy is near collapse due to its US$11
billion debt [42], made worse by continuing corruption
[42–44], high unemployment (80–85 %) [42, 45, 46], wide-
spread hunger [47], succession battles [42, 44, 48–51], and
a 2014 law that requires all companies to hand over 51 %
of shares to black Zimbabweans [52]. In the face of eco-
nomic strains, tobacco growing is likely to continue to be
a major income generator for the government.
Zimbabwe’s accession to the FCTC
In the past, Zimbabwe government officials and growers’
organizations have been outspoken supporters of to-
bacco growing and critics of the FCTC [31, 53, 54]. For
example, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe
expressed support early in his presidency for the tobacco
industry saying: “If we sell it, we must grow it as well. It
is our industry and we must support it” [31]. In 2000, at
the FCTC public hearings in Geneva, the ZTA criticized
the work of the FCTC as a “crusading task of drawing
up a global tobacco prohibition accord, to be legally im-
posed upon governments” [12]. (The FCTC does not, in
fact, ban tobacco growing [55]). Both the ZTA and the
ITGA developed a briefing on the FCTC describing it as
a “thoroughly bad and damaging international treaty”
which represented an “an attack on [Zimbabwe’s] na-
tional sovereignty” [32].
By 2010, as the FCTC garnered increasing inter-
national support, Zimbabwe appeared to re-assess the
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Minister of Agriculture and close ally of President Mu-
gabe, argued that it was time to join the FCTC because
the country’s outsider status made it more difficult to
protect its tobacco interests and it needed to work in
concert with other countries [13]. In 2013, Gavin Foster,
ZTA president, appealed to the Zimbabwean govern-
ment to sign the FCTC accord “so that we can defend
not only our tobacco growing industry but that of the
entire continent under threat. Lets [sic] us stop non pro-
ducing and non tobacco [sic] dependent countries;
countries and organisations with hidden agendas decid-
ing the future of our industry and livelihoods” [34]!
The need for tobacco control in Zimbabwe
While daily smoking prevalence among women in
Zimbabwe is relatively low (5 %), men’s smoking preva-
lence is much higher (33 %) [56], reflecting the growing
popularity of smoking among African men [57]. In
Africa, civil society organizations have played a key role
in spurring government tobacco control [58], but in
Zimbabwe only one civic tobacco control organization,
the Zimbabwe Framework for Tobacco Control Trust, is
apparently active. It applied to attend a recent FCTC
meeting but was turned away as it has no website, no
identifiable members, and scant media coverage [19, 59].
There is a demonstrable need for tobacco control in
Zimbabwe.
FCTC Membership: Obligations and Privileges
In addition to several general obligations, the FCTC re-
quires members to adopt and implement measures that
address tobacco control in three domains – tobacco de-
mand reduction, tobacco supply reduction, and protect-
ing the environment – as spelled out in the 18 primary
articles that comprise the treaty. Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 out-
line how Zimbabwe’s current tobacco control policies
and practices measure up against FCTC articles.
General obligations for FCTC Parties as outlined in
Article 5 require member countries to actively engage in
tobacco control work, financing and coordinating the
work on a national level (Table 1) [60]. Zimbabwe has
few tobacco control measures and one national tobacco
control law, Statutory Instrument 264 of 2002 [61]. In
2009 it had a national tobacco control agency (with one
employee), and no budget for tobacco control activities
[62]. In 2014 Zimbabwe developed national tobacco con-
trol objectives [63]. President Mugabe continues to pub-
licly express support for tobacco growing [64].
FCTC Article 5.3 specifies that tobacco control measures
should be protected from commercial or other vested in-
terests of the tobacco industry [60]. Just four months after
acceding to the FCTC, a Zimbabwean government minis-
try signed a Memorandum of Understanding accepting adonation of $527,000 from the British American Tobacco
(BAT) to enhance tobacco production by providing train-
ing, building tobacco curing barns, and improving access
to credit for youth, women, and disabled small farmers
[65–67].
Tobacco control activities to reduce demand (Articles
6-16) in Zimbabwe have been minimal (Table 2). Health
warnings are required on cigarette packages [56], there
are some designated smoke-free settings [68], and ciga-
rettes are taxed at 60 % of the retail price [68]. Beyond
that, there are few other regulations. Cigarettes are
widely advertised [56, 68], sponsorships by Savanna
Tobacco, a local Zimbabwean company, are common
[69–73], and single stick cigarette sales are popular to
market smoking to the poor [74]. There are no mass
education anti-smoking programs [56, 68], and govern-
ment and tobacco industry officials have publicly mini-
mized the dangers of smoking [34, 53]. For example, in
1994, at a national congress meeting, President Mugabe
minimized the risk of tobacco use when he said, “I think
WHO has its priorities wrong. Why can they not be
more fair with tobacco and start with alcohol” [53]. At
the 2013 World Tobacco Day ZTA president Gavin
Foster said, “The impact of tobacco on the health of
individuals whether on us growers, our workers and
families, processors, manufacturers, our end user the
smoker and the general populace ranks very low when
ranked against the World Health Organisation’s deadli-
est causes of death and diseases such as heart disease,
strokes, lower respiratory diseases, HIV, and other
NCDs” [34].
Tobacco control activities aimed at reducing the sup-
ply of tobacco (Articles 15-17) have been even less vigor-
ously pursued. There are widespread reports of cigarette
smuggling to surrounding countries [74–81]. While
there are laws to prevent tobacco sales to minors, [61]
young urban and rural dwellers report easy access
(Table 3) [82]. Article 17 is particularly challenging for
Zimbabwe since it involves the “provision of support for
economically viable alternative activities” to tobacco
growing. Both government and industry officials claim
that there are no economically viable alternative crops
to replace tobacco, [34, 83] despite evidence to the con-
trary [84]. Local media reports continue to emphasize
the advantages of growing tobacco [85, 86].
Finally, tobacco control efforts aimed at the “protection
of the environment and health of persons” (Article 18) rep-
resent another hurdle (Table 4) [60]. Deforestation is a par-
ticularly significant problem for Zimbabwe [23, 87–93],
since flue-cured tobacco requires heat to process the
leaves, and wood is used as a fuel supply [87].
A key privilege of joining the FCTC is becoming a vot-
ing member at Conference of the Party (COP) meetings
[14]. COP is the governing body of the FCTC and is
Table 1 Zimbabwe’s 2015 tobacco control policies in relation to FCTC general obligations
FCTC Article [60] Zimbabwe’s tobacco control policies Zimbabwe’s practice





• One law, Statutory Instrument 264 of
2002, outlines smoke-free premises, no
smoking signs, tobacco and children,
product ingredients disclosures,
promotion of tobacco products, and
importing tobacco.
• The government rationale for joining the FCTC was:
“[w]e cannot fight from outside and win [13].”–
Minister of Agriculture (2010)
• “We will grow [tobacco] for those who want to
smoke it. You should listen to what your doctor
says. But if you over smoke, don’t blame us [64].”–
President Robert Mugabe (April, 2015)• The Minister
of Agriculture-Joseph Made described an unusual
unity between black and white farmers in order to
save tobacco-Zimbabwe’s dominant cash crop.
“There are no differences between us on this one,”
he says. “Everyone is working together….[13]” (2010)
• Economic problems and corruption [42–44] slow
tobacco control implementation and coordination.
Article 5.3: Protect tobacco
control policies from
commercial and other
vested interests of the
tobacco industry.
• No laws protect tobacco control policies
from tobacco industry interests.
• Media reports credit nepotism for government’s
failure to act on Zimbabwe’s Savanna Tobacco
Company smuggling charges. Savanna Tobacco is
owned by Mugabe’s relative [75, 81].
• “There is need for all of us to be aware of the
tobacco industry’s activities to undermine tobacco
control efforts through advertising, promotion and
sponsorship which lure you into believing that
tobacco is good…We will not tolerate any
interference from the tobacco industry as we go
about our duty of forming and enforcing laws that
are good for the health of our people [110].”–
Minister of Health Madzorera (2013)
• Zimbabwe government ministry accepted $527,000
from BAT to support small tobacco farmers [65].
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and amend policies, make decisions on implementation,
and discuss compliance with FCTC articles [94]. FCTC
rules stipulate that COP meets in regular sessions
biennially and that further work happens in regional
meetings and designated working groups between COP
meetings [95]. Membership in working and regional
groups is voluntary. Decision-making is by consensus
among Parties (observers can comment), with the caveat
that a three-quarter majority rule is acceptable for sub-
stantive matters or a simple majority rule for procedural
matters [95]. In past practice, consensus has dominated
decision-making. Given the preference for consensus and
voluntary membership in regional and working groups,
there are opportunities for a Party to influence or obstruct
FCTC provisions that it finds objectionable. Moreover, as
a member of COP, Zimbabwe will be party to negotiations
and have access to documents and conversations that
would likely be of interest to the tobacco industry.
In acceding to the FCTC, Zimbabwe has joined a club
to which 43 of 47 African nations belong. (Only Eritrea,
Malawi, and South Sudan have not ratified the FCTC.
Mozambique has signed but not ratified the treaty [16,
96]). African regional unity was key to negotiating a
strong treaty, with African nations (both tobacco produ-
cing and non-producing) voting as a bloc and making alli-
ances with other regional blocs to advance their tobaccocontrol agenda [9, 10]. Thus, at COP meetings, Zimbabwe
may contend with pressure to advance not simply its own
interests, but regional interests as well [96].
Future COP meetings are likely to discuss two issues
of particular significance for Zimbabwe: strengthening
Article 5.3, and reviewing progress on recommendations
for implementing Articles 17 and 18. Article 5.3 specifies
that tobacco control measures should be protected from
commercial or other vested interests of the tobacco in-
dustry [60]. Recent COPs have accelerated efforts to
comply with Article 5.3 [60] which was first adopted at
COP3 [97]. At COP5, Parties requested further discus-
sion about the large number of industry representatives
among the public attendees at COP meetings. At COP6,
discussion centered on the need for more rigorous and
advance vetting of the public (including the media) at
future COP meetings and the exclusion of observers
at the current meeting, where all Party delegates (not
just observers, as before) might be required to file a
declaration denying “any form of real, perceived, or
potential conflict of interest with the tobacco indus-
try” ([98, 99], pp. 31-32).
Further discussion on minimizing industry influence
and accelerating Article 5.3 implementation is likely to
occur at COP7 scheduled to take place in New Delhi in
late 2016. Specific language to strengthen Article 5.3
could result in the exclusion of media, observers, or
Table 2 Zimbabwe’s 2015 tobacco control policies in relation to FCTC measures to reduce demand for tobacco
FCTC Article [60] Zimbabwe’s tobacco control policies & activities Zimbabwe’s practice
Article 6: Price and tax measures
to reduce the demand for tobacco
• Tax is 45 % of the retail price of cigarettes. [111] • Tobacco growers and leaf buyers are also taxed [22].
Article 8: Protection from exposure
to tobacco smoke
• 3 smoke-free public places: health care
institutions; non-University educational facilities;
and public transport [68].
• Fine of Z$500, imprisonment or both for
violators [112].
• No/scant enforcement for passive smoking
laws-Ministry of Health [113].
Article 9: Regulation of the
contents of tobacco products
• No regulations identified.
Article 10: Regulation of tobacco
product disclosures
• Statutory Instrument 264, sec 7
• “Every tobacco product shall bear accurate
information on the percentage of the tar
and nicotine content and any other
ingredients…visible on the package [61].”
Article 11: Packaging and labeling
of tobacco products
• Brand descriptors (e.g.,“light,” “low tar”)
allowed [9, 56].
• 20 % of cigarette package must be covered
by health warning [9, 56, 63].
• Packaging must contain one of three
health warnings [61].
• Inexpensive, single stick cigarette sales are lucrative
marketing strategy in Africa [114, 115] aimed at low
income, low education, and young smokers [114].
• Smuggled single stick packages create tobacco
control challenges for surrounding countries [74]
• BAT-Z accused of selling cigarettes without
Zimbabwe’s prescribed warnings [116].
Article 12: Education,
communication, training and
public awareness of tobacco
control issues
• No mass education campaigns implemented
between 2012-2014 [56, 68].
• World No Tobacco Day has been celebrated
in Zimbabwe since 2013 [117, 118].
• Government officials minimize risk of tobacco
use [34, 53].
• No whole population media anti-smoking
messages [63, 111].
Article 13: Comprehensive ban
on tobacco advertising,
promotion and sponsorship
• No direct or indirect bans on tobacco
advertising, promotion or sponsorship
[56, 68], (except,visual entertainment)
[9, 56].
• Promotional events are only allowed for
adults [61].
• No bans on free cigarette distribution,
promotional discounts, sponsored events,
or corporate social responsibility activities [56].
• Savanna Tobacco Co. sponsored Miss Zimbabwe
contest [70], Zimbabwe’s signature musician, Oliver
Mtukudzi [71], local soccer teams [72, 73], and proposed
$10 million donation for Harare stadium to be named
after its Pacific brand [69].
• 63–77 % of youth exposed to tobacco advertising and
69–86 % exposed to brand names at sports events [82].
• Tobacco marketing in Zimbabwe–more aggressive
than in high income countries [119].
Article 14: Demand reduction
measures concerning tobacco
dependence and cessation.
• Nicotine Replacement Therapy (sold with
prescription) and/or some smoking cessation
services available; costs not covered [68].
No national quitline [111].
Table 3 Zimbabwe’s 2015 tobacco control policies in relation to FCTC measures to reduce supply for tobacco
FCTC Article [60] Zimbabwe’s tobacco control policies & activities Zimbabwe’s practice
Article 15: Eliminate illicit trade
in tobacco products.
• No tax stamps, local-language cigarette
pack warnings, aggressive enforcement,
or penalties in place [120].
• Cigarette smuggling by STC and BAT-Z widely
reported in media [75–81].
Article 16: Prohibit sales to
and by minors
• Sales of tobacco to under age 18 is
prohibited [61].
• Enforcement information unavailable.
• 12 % of youth-current smokers [56]
• 28–49 % bought cigarettes in a store [82].
Article 17: Provision of support
for economically viable
alternate activities
• No government sponsored programs
to promote alternative crops.
• Ronald Watts, Zambian agricultural consultant,
listed 53 possible alternative crops that could be
developed in the region (1993) [84, 121].
• “There are no sustainable, economic [ally] viable
alternate crops to tobacco [34].” ZTA chairman (2014)
• Government and industry officials say- no economically
viable alternative crops exist to replace tobacco [34, 83].
• Incentives for tobacco growing remain strong with
increasing acreage devoted to it [122, 123].
• Local media favor stories of successful tobacco
growing [85, 86].
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Table 4 Zimbabwe’s 2015 tobacco control policies in relation to FCTC measure to protect the environment
FCTC Article [60] Zimbabwe’s tobacco control policies & activities Zimbabwe’s practice
Article 18: Due regard for the protection of
the environment and the health of persons in
respect to tobacco cultivation and manufacture
• Section 4 of Zimbabwe’s Environmental
Management Act (Chapter 20:27), 2002,
describes 4 general environmental rights:
1) Clean healthy environment;
2) Access to environmental information;
3) Environment to be protected for benefit
of present and future generations;
4) Right to promote policies to end pollution
and environmental degradation, and support
sustainable management of resources [124].
• Statutory Instrument 116 of 2012 regulates
use and trade of firewood and timber [125].
• Deforestation is widespread [23, 87–92]
threatening to denude the country by
2016 [23, 88, 91, 93, 126].
• Zimbabwe is among top 10 countries for
largest forest cover loss between 1990 and
2010 [127].
• Child labor on tobacco farms exposes
children to harmful pesticides and fertilizers
and prevents school attendance [128, 129].
• Tobacco pickers risk nicotine poisoning
[130, 131].
• Tobacco industry sponsors Sustainable
Afforestation tree planting program [91, 132].
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mandatory use of new tools to track implementation of
Article 5.3; increased transparency regarding industry in-
volvement in Party countries; and the elimination of
conflicts of interest for government officials and em-
ployees [100].
COP has been working on how best to implement Ar-
ticles 17 and 18 since 2006. (Article 17 was included in
the FCTC to protect tobacco farmers by addressing the
possible economic consequences of effective tobacco
control policies that could reduce demand for their crop
[101].) At COP6 in 2014, an Articles 17/18 working
group submitted its report. Although it was 8 years in
the making, COP6 decided that the report needed fur-
ther refinement. Parties quickly established an informal
group to provide a brief set of nine recommendations
drawn from the report ([99], p 16) COP6 adopted the
policy options and recommendations in the full working
group report despite divergent views [102] and requested
that the Convention Secretariat implement the nine
recommendations ([99], p. 79). The working group’s
mandate was not renewed [99]. At COP7 (New Delhi,
2016), the Secretariat will provide a progress report on
the implementation of the recommendations [99]. Issues
related to planting alternative crops and reducing envir-
onmental and health damage from tobacco growing are
contentious and complex and any proposed solutions
are likely to pose challenges for Zimbabwe, now officially
involved in future discussions.
Discussion
Zimbabwe’s current economic hardship, its robust to-
bacco growing and distribution infrastructure, and con-
tinued world demand for tobacco suggest that the
government will continue to prioritize tobacco produc-
tion in the absence of incentives to do otherwise. Its re-
cent decision to accede to the FCTC does not appear to
represent a softening of its historical opposition to the
treaty, but rather a strategic move to better protect anddefend its tobacco interests in a world with a growing
commitment to tobacco control.
Zimbabwe is not the first tobacco-dependent nation to
sign on to the FCTC. Brazil, despite its status as one of
the world’s top tobacco producers, was instrumental in
the creation of the FCTC and has been successful in re-
ducing tobacco use by 50 % [103, 104]. Like Zimbabwe,
most of its tobacco growing revenue came from exports.
Since tobacco control measures that target internal to-
bacco use cause little conflict with export profits, Brazil
was able to meet many of its FCTC obligations [105].
South Africa and Zambia, despite having strong tobacco
growing industries, have also been able to advance to-
bacco control [9, 106].
These examples suggest that Zimbabwe may also be
able to implement tobacco control at home [105]. As a
member of the FCTC, Zimbabwe’s internal tobacco con-
trol organizations and the Ministry of Health will now
have international support to develop and promote
stronger tobacco control measures [19]. Vigorous track-
ing of compliance with FCTC measures by the FCTC
secretariat and public consequences for failure to meet
obligations would further support tobacco control efforts
in Zimbabwe [107].
Of concern is Zimbabwe’s recent acceptance of a fi-
nancial donation from BAT just months after acceding
to the FCTC. This action could jeopardize Zimbabwe’s
participation in FCTC activities especially if there is
stricter FCTC monitoring of compliance with Article 5.3
for “real, perceived, or potential conflict of interests”
[99]. Acceptance of the BAT donation is a flagrant act of
non-compliance with Articles 5.3, 17, and 18 [67].
Given these alliances Zimbabwe may undermine ef-
forts to implement and strengthen the FCTC. For in-
stance, its delegates could act as the eyes and the ears of
the tobacco industry, reporting back on delegates’ activ-
ities and sharing draft documents. This occurred previ-
ously when a Brazilian delegate who made numerous
calls to a Brazilian subsidiary of BAT during COP4
Lown et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:2 Page 8 of 11meetings [108]. The inclusion of delegates with tobacco
industry agendas within FCTC does occur (although it
has been declining), and there are no current clear
mechanisms to prevent this until a formal vetting
process for delegates is in place.
Zimbabwe’s status as a Party also offers it the oppor-
tunity to influence ongoing discussions about Articles 17
and 18. The FCTC has been slow to agree on a coherent
and effective policy around supporting economically vi-
able alternatives to tobacco growing and protecting the
environment. Although the working group devoted to
these issues no longer exists, discussions about alterna-
tive crops are likely to remain active, particularly if de-
mand for tobacco declines. In the interim, Zimbabwe
may be dismissive of many of the Articles 17/18 recom-
mendations. Given COP’s preference for consensus-
based decision-making, it may require little effort by
Zimbabwe to further stall progress. Zimbabwe could be
aided in this endeavor by its natural alliances with other
tobacco growers in the region – particularly in those
countries to which white Zimbabwean tobacco farmers
emigrated. However, the strong bloc of unified African
countries that have a history of support for the FCTC
may also hold Zimbabwe in check. Some of Zimbabwe’s
neighbors have much stronger tobacco control (e.g.,
Zambia). Zimbabwe’s accession to the FCTC may be
welcome in the region since membership will provide an
obligation for Zimbabwe to take measures to reduce
smuggling.Conclusion
By 2025, much of Africa faces a worsening tobacco epi-
demic among men [109]. Implementing the FCTC’s de-
mand reduction measures has the potential to reverse
this outcome. By its own admission, Zimbabwe joined
the FCTC as a Party in order to defend its tobacco
growing interests, but its status as a Party may open
doors for tobacco control. Zimbabwe’s participation in
the FCTC as a whole, and progress on Articles 5.3, 17,
and 18 in particular, may ultimately depend on alle-
giances that exist between Zimbabwe’s delegates and 1)
the tobacco industry, 2) the Zimbabwean government,
and 3) Parties within the African region, as well as vigor-
ous FCTC monitoring for compliance. To encourage
Zimbabwe to be a productive member of the FCTC, it
will be necessary to increase pressure on Parties to resist
tobacco industry interference and comply with treaty
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